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Marta Szpala 
The negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement 
to normalise relations between the two states are to enter a new phase in September. Al-
though the negotiations, which have been going on since 2011 under the oversight of the 
European Union, may have prompted the incorporation of the Serbian minority and the ter-
ritories it inhabits into Kosovo’s institutional system, they have been at a standstill for three 
years. The authorities in Prishtina are unwilling to agree to further concessions to the Serbs 
until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s independence, at least on a de facto basis. Any compro-
mise will come at a high political cost for the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo, due to 
hostility on the part of the public and the opposition in both states. Meanwhile, the EU and 
the US are putting pressure on Belgrade and Prishtina to reach an agreement by no later than 
mid-2019. The Serbian and Kosovar elites cannot ignore this pressure as they largely owe their 
political positions to support from the West, and for this reason the authorities in both states 
wish to play for time and prolong the talks. They are doing this by periodically escalating 
tensions and putting forward solutions that are unacceptable to the other party or the inter-
national community. One example of this was the proposals made in July by the presidents 
of Serbia and Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučic and Hashim Thaçi, to exchange territory and change 
borders, which caused a great deal of controversy inside and outside the countries. Moreover, 
divisions between countries in the West, which do not have a united strategy regarding the 
negotiations, may hamper moves to reach a compromise. The United States is pushing for 
a quick resolution of the dispute, even if this means reviewing the borders. However, Germa-
ny is opposed to that solution as it fears that this would strengthen separatist movements 
throughout the entire Balkans. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will try to exploit these 
divisions, while the success of the process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations will in fact 
depend upon effective pressure from the West. 
Impasse 
The dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo un-
der EU supervision began in March 2011, three 
years after Kosovo declared independence. The 
European Commission used the two states’ as-
pirations towards EU membership as an incen-
tive to resolve the contentious issues, offering 
progress in European integration in exchange. 
Thirty-three agreements were reached, main-
ly regarding technical issues. In April 2013, 
the Brussels agreement was signed, which 
gave Prishtina control over the entire coun-
try. The authorities in Belgrade agreed that 
four Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo 
and their power structures (the police and civ-
il defence formations), together with the jus-
tice and law enforcement authorities in Kosovo, 
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would be controlled by authorities in Prishtina. 
In exchange, Kosovo was to grant a broad range 
of rights to the Association of Serbian Munici-
palities (Zajednica Srpskih Opština, ZSO). This 
association was to be established by 10 munici-
palities in which the majority of inhabitants are 
Serbs1. However, the ZSO agreement has still 
not been implemented today due to public hos-
tility and protests by the opposition in Kosovo. 
The authorities in Belgrade retain an influence 
over the internal situation in Kosovo, controlling 
the main Serb minority grouping. Kosovar op-
ponents to the agreement with Serbia say that 
creating the ZSO would cause the situation to 
deteriorate further and render Kosovo depend-
ent on Serbia’s policies, and furthermore that 
Prishtina has gained nothing in return for these 
concessions because Serbia has still not recog-
nised Kosovo’s independence. The act establish-
ing the ZSO was blocked in 2015 by the Consti-
tutional Court of Kosovo, upon which Prishtina 
proposed renegotiating the agreement. How-
ever, Serbia has consistently demanded that 
it be implemented in the agreed form. At the 
same time, the negotiation formula used to 
date – with a focus on resolving technical is-
sues but not the question of Kosovo’s status – 
has run its course. The dialogue has continued 
despite this, even though it proved impossible 
to reach further agreements, and the imple-
1 First agreement of principles governing the normalization of 
relations, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/
FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_THE_
NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRUS-
SELS_en.pdf. An additional agreement was signed in August 
2015 laying down the precise entitlements of the ZSO, Asso-
ciaton/Community of Serb majority municipalites in Kosovo 
– general principles/main elements, http://eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/150825_02_associa-
tion-community-of-serb-majority-municipalities-in-koso-
vo-general-principles-main-elements_en.pdf 
mentation of those already reached has slowed 
considerably. As a result, relations between 
Belgrade and Prishtina have become increas-
ingly strained instead of improving. There has 
been a significant increase in public opposition 
to the negotiations, especially in Kosovo. 
Serbia’s moves to draw out the talks 
Resolving the Serbian-Kosovo dispute does not 
serve the purposes of the authorities in Belgrade 
because it is their main bargaining chip in their 
relations with the EU, and Serbia’s influence in 
Kosovo gives it better international standing. 
In exchange for a conciliatory approach towards 
Kosovo, the EU states and the US are tolerat-
ing undemocratic practices on the part of the 
Belgrade authorities. Recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence (even at a de facto level) and the 
signing of a comprehensive agreement with 
Prishtina at an early stage of Serbia’s integration 
into the EU would thus harm Belgrade’s inter-
ests. Serbia has no guarantee that it will actually 
be admitted, even if it meets all the criteria.
In Serbia, there is a great deal of opposition to 
any agreement with Kosovo. Opinion polls re-
veal that 81% of Serbs are against recognising 
Kosovo’s independence even if this would accel-
erate EU integration. At the same time, 43% of 
respondents say they realise that Serbia has lost 
Kosovo, while 45% take the opposite view2. For 
63% of respondents, the ‘frozen conflict’ is the 
optimal solution to the current situation, and 
only 21% are in favour of an agreement with 
the authorities in Prishtina3. However, President 
Aleksandar Vučic’s dominance on the political 
scene means that he would be able to win over 
the public to a compromise with Prishtina both 
in Serbia, where the opposition is weak and 
fragmented, and among Serbs in Kosovo, be-
cause the Serb groups there are controlled by 
2 O. Karaberg, Može li Vučić preživeti referendum o Kosovu?, 
Radio Slobodna Evropa, 8 July 2018, https://www.slobod-
naevropa.org/a/most-referendum-kosovo/29348775.html 
3 B. Baković, Dve trećine Srba tuguje zbog Kosova, “Politika”, 
8 June 2018, http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/405205/Dve 
-trecine-Srba-tuguje-zbog-Kosova 
Serbian-Kosovo negotiations have been 
at a standstill for three years and relations 
between the two states are becoming 
increasingly strained.
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Vučic hardliners. The fact that the major Serbi-
an media are controlled by businessmen linked 
to the president would also make this easier. 
Kosovo unwilling to make concessions
Reaching an agreement is a priority for Kosovo 
because without Serbia’s recognition Prishtina 
cannot function effectively in the internation-
al arena. However, an agreement would mean 
concessions to Belgrade, which the public op-
poses. The negotiations are hampered by the 
lack of strong political leaders ready to lend 
their face to the process of normalisation of 
relations with Serbia. President Hashim Thaçi, 
who is leading the negotiations, has a low po-
litical standing, even within the ruling Kosovo 
Democratic Party with which he is associated. 
Both the opposition and members of his parent 
grouping alike allege that the President owes his 
position to support from the West, especially 
the US, and in return is making concessions to 
Serbia that harm the country’s national interests. 
The fragmentation and fierce rivalry within the 
Kosovo political scene mean that the leaders of 
individual groups are more likely to wish to build 
their position based on taking an uncompromis-
ing stance towards Belgrade than supporting 
compromise. Moreover, the opposition group-
ing Vetëvendosje, which contests any conces-
sions made to Serbia, is actively stirring up public 
opposition to the negotiations. 
Incidents and staged provocations 
In view of the domestic situation, the author-
ities in Serbia and Kosovo are more interest-
ed in exploiting the negotiations for ongoing 
political gain and enhancing their image as 
defenders of national interests than working 
out compromises. In recent years, the esca-
lation of tension has led to increased public 
opposition to an agreement, which serves the 
purposes of both Kosovar and Serbian politi-
cians in relations with the West as a conven-
ient pretext for prolonging the negotiations. 
Belgrade and Prishtina have resorted to stag-
ing provocative incidents in bilateral relations, 
aimed at mobilising the electorate and mak-
ing the candidates of the ruling parties more 
popular as defenders of their national inter-
ests. One example of such measures was the 
political crisis that broke out in January 2017 
when a train bearing the words ‘Kosovo is 
Serbia’ was sent to Mitrovica in Kosovo just 
before the presidential election in Serbia. 
In March 2018, there was an incident in which 
Marko Đurić, Director of the Office for Kosovo 
and Metohija, was detained by the Kosovo spe-
cial services. There is much evidence that at the 
time the Serbian authorities needed the spectac-
ular detention of a high-level Serbian official. 
Seeking a comprehensive resolution
The stalemate in the negotiations and the in-
creasingly fragile situation in the Balkans have 
led the EU to reassess its position on the Koso-
vo issue. In July 2017, facing pressure from the 
EU, Presidents Hashim Thaçi and Aleksandar 
Vučić announced that they were entering a new 
phase of talks aimed at producing a compre-
hensive agreement normalising Kosovo-Serbian 
relations. The complicated situation following 
the elections in Germany, which plays a key 
role in formulating EU Balkan policy, prevent-
ed the member states and EU institutions from 
devising a negotiation strategy. This provided 
the authorities in Belgrade and Prishtina with 
a pretext for delaying the next round of negoti-
ations, which was the need to build a national 
consensus on a solution to the contentious is-
sues. In July 2017, President Vučić announced 
a broad range of national consultations on the 
Refusal to recognise Kosovo’s independ-
ence is hampering Prishtina’s activities on 
the international scene, making it unwilling 
to accept further concessions towards the 
Serbs until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s 
independence at least at a de facto level.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 281 4
future of Kosovo, while in Kosovo in spring 
this year an attempt was made to build a non- 
-partisan consensus in favour of dialogue with 
Serbia. Neither of these initiatives led to the for-
mulation of a negotiating position, but they did 
allow those in power to acclimatise the public 
to the concept of a Kosovo-Serbian agreement. 
In its new strategy for the Western Balkans, 
announced in February, the European Commis-
sion stated that Serbia had an opportunity to 
join the EU by 2025 provided that it concluded 
a legally binding agreement with Kosovo. For 
this deadline to be met, an agreement would 
have to be worked out by no later than the end 
of 20194. The United States is also pushing for 
a solution. An all-embracing solution would 
cover a range of issues: demarcation of the bor-
der, the form and procedure for the mutual rec-
ognition of independence, questions concern-
ing private and state-owned assets, and the 
positions of the Serbian minority and the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church and places of worship in 
the Kosovo legal system. Another troublesome 
issue is accountability for war crimes in the two 
states. Reaching an agreement on this issue will 
be very difficult. Before the round of negotia-
tions scheduled for September, the two parties 
have proposed solutions intended to strength-
en their negotiating positions both with the 
West and on the domestic stage. These propos-
als will also be a means of testing the West’s 
reaction and the reaction of their own public.
4 Scenarios for the ‘Grand Finale’ between Kosovo and 
Serbia, April 2018, http://balkansgroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/SCENARIOS-FOR-THE-GRAND-FINA-
LE-BETWEEN-KOSOVO-AND-SERBIA.pdf 
The Serbian proposal to divide Kosovo 
Prior to and subsequent to Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence, Serbian politicians (as well as 
foreign analysts) have speculated at times on 
the benefits of the possible division of Kosovo 
and rejoining the northern part of the country 
to Serbia in exchange for recognition of inde-
pendence5. This concerns four municipalities 
and North Mitrovica. Although most Serbs in 
Kosovo live in enclaves in the south of the coun-
try (totalling between 45,000 and 75,000 peo-
ple)6, it is in fact North Mitrovica, as the only 
Serbian urban concentration, that is the admin-
istrative centre for the Serb minority in Kosovo. 
The idea of dividing Kosovo was not a major 
factor in the debate for a number of years be-
cause it contradicted the principle of the in-
violability of administrative boundaries from 
Yugoslavian times and the proposal to create 
multi-ethnic states, which were the foundation 
of the West’s policy towards the Balkans. In re-
cent weeks, a public debate about division of 
Kosovo was triggered by an interview given by 
the US ambassador in Prishtina, Greg Delawie. 
When asked about the US’ view on the issue, for 
the first time Greg Delawie did not give a pure-
ly negative response, but gave a more evasive 
answer7. This comment prompted wide specu-
lation about a change in Washington’s position, 
which until that time had been to officially rule 
out that possibility8. Statements made by the 
US embassies in Prishtina and Belgrade that 
5 At one time this was favoured among others by the 
prime minister Zoran Djindjić, ‘Moguća podela KiM 
u dve faze’, “Blic”, 27 March 2007, https://www.blic.rs/
vesti/politika/moguca-podela-kim-u-dve-faze/fc68tv0 
6 M. Milošević, Krizna grupa i kosovska rupa, “Vreme”, 
2 September 2010, https://www.vreme.com//cms/view.
php?id=948073 
7 US Ambassador in Pristina Sparks Kosovo Partition Spec-
ulations, “Balkan Insight”, 20 July 2018, http://www.
balkaninsight.com/en/article/us-ambassador-to-pristi-
na-delawie-kosovo-partition-07-20-2018 
8 In June 2018 the CEAS, a think tank working closely with 
the US, also published a report recommending partition 
of Kosovo. See West Side Story, CEAS, June 2018, https://
www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2018/CEAS_Study_-West_
Side_Story.pdf 
Maintaining the status quo in relations 
with Prishtina is advantageous to Ser-
bia, but, facing pressure from the West, 
Belgrade has agreed to talks to work out 
an all-embracing agreement with Kosovo.
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“creativity and flexibility” were needed to pro-
duce permanent solutions in relations between 
the two states exacerbated the unease9.
The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, 
seized this opportunity, trying to find a balance 
between pressure from the West for a compro-
mise with Prishtina and public opposition to 
recognising Kosovo’s independence. In an in-
terview for the Croatian weekly Globus at the 
end of July, Vučić stated that “the Serbs know 
that Kosovo has been lost, but will do anything 
to preserve what it can”10. This statement is an 
indication that Vučic is willing to present the 
accession of the four municipalities to Serbia 
as a success11. In such a case Belgrade would 
undoubtedly stress that Serbia has taken over 
the most valuable enterprise in the area, such 
as the Trepča mining, metalwork and chemical 
complex, with deposits such as silver, zinc, and 
lead, and a complex of water reservoirs, dams 
and the Gazivoda power station. This would 
make it easier for the president to convince 
the public to accept Kosovo’s independence. 
Foreign minister Ivica Dačić12 also spoke out in 
favour of that solution during a visit to the US, 
promoting that concept among people work-
9 SAD: Dalekovidost i fleksibilnost potrebni za održivo 
rešenje za Kosovo, RTS 9 August 2018, http://www.rts.
rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/3225429/sad-dalekov-
idost-i-fleksibilnost-potrebni-za-odrzivo-resenje.html 
10 Vučić za hrvatski “Globus”: Svi Srbi znaju da su izgubili 
Kosovo, “Blic”, 26 July 2018, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/
politika/vucic-za-hrvatski-globus-svi-srbi-znaju-da-su-
izgubili-kosovo/ht8qxgz
11 33% of respondents in Serbia are in favour of the parti-
tion of Kosovo. O. Karaberg, Može li Vučić preživeti ref-
erendum… 
12 Dačić: Podela Kosova jedino moguće i brzo rešenje, ali 
treba videti i druge opcije, “Blic”, 28 May 2018, https://
www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/dacic-podela-kosova-jedi-
no-moguce-i-brzo-resenje-ali-treba-videti-i-druge-opci-
je/l9pefsm
ing with Donald Trump13. Reviewing the bor-
ders between Serbia and Kosovo in accordance 
with the ethnic spread of the population would 
probably also be used by Serbian politicians in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina as grounds for their 
own aspirations to secession.
This would also have negative consequences 
for Serbia. It would significantly undermine Bel-
grade’s influence over the authorities in Prishti-
na and the position of the Serbian minority. In 
such a situation, Serbia would not be likely to 
negotiate solutions favourable for the minori-
ty and the Serbian Orthodox Church (the most 
important Serbian religious sites are located in 
south Kosovo). If they were deprived of their 
special status, Serbs would probably leave the 
enclave in the south of the country even more 
quickly. For this reason, orthodox priests from 
Kosovo are most opposed to the partition. In an 
open letter, Bishop Teodosije  of Raska-Prizren 
criticised this idea, saying that it would mean 
an end to the Serbian presence in the region14. 
Contrary to Belgrade’s intentions, this propos-
al could be taken advantage of by the minori-
ties living in Serbia – apart from the Albanians 
from the Preševo Valley, the Bosnians from the 
Sandžak as well. 
Kosovo’s counterproposal
The rejoining  of the four Serbian municipalities 
to Serbia would be very hard for the Kosovo 
public to accept. For Prishtina too, any solu-
tion of this kind would also be harmful from 
an economic and strategic point of view. The 
Gazivoda reservoir is crucial in supplying the 
capital with electricity and water and as a cool-
er for the Obilić power station, which produces 
97% of the electricity in Kosovo. Handing over 
the Serbian municipalities would also deprive 
Kosovo of the potential revenue from mining 
13 Server: Na ideju o podeli Kosova Amerikaci će reći ne, 
“Danas”, 16 August 2018. https://www.danas.rs/politika/
server-na-ideju-o-podeli-kosova-amerikaci-ce-reci-ne/
14 Vladika Teodosije: Podela KiM vodi iseljavanju Srba, 
stradanju baštine..., RTS, 25 July 2018, http://www.rts.rs/pa 
ge/stories/sr/story/9/politika/3210651/vladika-teodosije 
-podela-kim-vodi-iseljavanju-srba-stradanju-bastine.html
The Kosovo and Serbian authorities will try 
to play for time because any concessions 
to the opposite party will come at a polit-
ical cost; strong pressure is needed from 
the West if an agreement is to be reached.
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the deposits in Trepča. Despite this, Kosovo’s 
President Hashim Thaçi has not unequivocally 
rejected the Serbian proposal, but did propose 
revising the borders and joining three Serbian 
municipalities inhabited by an Albanian mi-
nority (such as the Preševo Valley) to Kosovo. 
The president’s proposal was rejected by all of 
the parliamentary groups in Kosovo. The rul-
ing Kosovo Democratic Party, co-founded by 
Hashim Thaçi, has also said that it opposes this 
solution. However, President Thaçi has stated 
that he would accept certain changes to bor-
ders. This would probably mean handing a few 
villages in the north of Kosovo over to Serbia.
Prospects
The authorities in Kosovo and Serbia are not keen 
to enter into a comprehensive agreement be-
cause any concessions made to the other side will 
come at a high political cost. There are numerous 
opponents to the negotiations in both countries. 
There is also little likelihood of the process of the 
two states’ EU integration being accelerated in 
exchange for a compromise, which was the prin-
cipal prerequisite for the previous agreements. 
At the same time, however, two states’ leaders 
of the will gain support from the West by demon-
strating a will to resolve the dispute, in contrast 
to the opposition forces in both states, which re-
ject any proposals for a compromise. It is there-
fore in the interest of the authorities in Kosovo 
and Serbia to prolong the negotiations and not 
work out an understanding. This is achieved 
through periodically exacerbating tensions be-
tween the two states to give them a pretext to 
put off the next round of negotiations. These 
practices will probably continue.
Any agreement between Belgrade and Prishtina 
will depend above all on how effective pressure 
from the West is, and whether the EU coun-
tries and the US are capable of formulating 
a common strategy in negotiations with Serbia 
and Kosovo. Washington seems to be seeking 
a quick solution to the Kosovo question and 
is willing to reward Belgrade for concessions 
with a favourable re-establishment of borders. 
Assistant Secretary of State A. Wess Mitchell has 
said that the US’ priority is resolving the conten-
tious issues in the Balkans in cooperation with 
the EU, because this contention enables Rus-
sia to strengthen its position in the region15. 
It seems that Washington’s influence in Kosovo is 
sufficient for the US to be able to win the Kosovo 
elites over to this solution, but it is not accept-
able to Germany and the UK16, due to the fear 
of a domino effect17. Chancellor Angela Merkel 
has rejected the idea of changing borders in the 
Balkans18. Russia will probably be active in moves 
to prevent the question of Kosovo’s independ-
ence being resolved as it would lose its main 
means of exerting pressure on Serbia. At the 
same time, a solution in which there were ter-
ritorial changes would benefit Russia, because 
this would be a flywheel for territorial revision-
ism in the region, making it easier for Moscow 
to destabilise the countries in the region and 
crush their pro-Western aspirations. 
15 Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European and Eur-
asian Affairs A. Wess Mitchell’s speech at the Heritage 
Foundation, 6 June 2018, https://ge.usembassy.gov/assis-
tant-secretary-of-the-bureau-of-european-and-eurasian-
affairs-a-wess-mitchells-speech-at-the-heritage-foun-
dation-as-prepared-june-6/; Vladika Teodosije: Podela 
KiM..., RTS, 25 July 2018, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/
sr/story/9/politika/3210651/vladika-teodosije-pode-
la-kim-vodi-iseljavanju-srba-stradanju-bastine.html 
16 A.Z. Loxha, London i Berlin protiv ‘korekcije granica’, 
Radio Slobodna Evropa, 9 August 2018, https://www.
slobodnaevropa.org/a/kosovo-podele-granice-medjun-
arodna-zajednica/29422044.html
17 The re-establishment of borders in Kosovo would prob-
ably prompt such proposals from, for instance, the Al-
banian minority in Montenegro and Macedonia, and the 
Bosniaks in Serbia’s Novi Pazar area.
18 A. Grey, Angela Merkel: No Balkan border changes, Po-
litico, 13 August 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/
angela-merkel-no-balkan-border-changes-kosovo-ser-
bia-vucic-thaci/ 
The US is seeking a quick solution to the 
Kosovo question even if this means estab-
lishing new borders, but this is unaccept-
able for Berlin.
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